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Introduction
Without the participation of the patient, a health care provider cannot effectively treat (or prevent) disease-causing behaviors. The doctor-patient relationship is therefore gradually evolving from a paternalistic approach to a more participatory model [1, 2] . Houston and Ehrenberger argue that a key factor for successful patient participation is information sharing: not only do patients require good information to care for themselves but also to eectively communicate with their physicians [3] . Empowering the patient with information is particularly important since information exchange between dierent caregivers is very limited [4] , especially when thinking beyond local business networks (such as the Partners HealthCare system in the US state of Massachusetts or the The Eye Care Network in the Netherlands [5, 6] ).
The two key stakeholders in this scenario, i.e., patients and their physicians, are quite willing and capable to share information: already before the turn of the millennium, for instance, various online surveys demonstrated high adoption rates of e-mail as a patient-provider communication medium [7] . E-mail information sharing, unfortunately, has several limitations: most notably, message exchanges are completely ad-hoc, which makes it very hard for patients to build and maintain a longitudinal record of their health data, use the integrated record to eectively care for themselves and share all their health data eectively and securely to their caregivers.
To overcome these limitations, Personal Health Record (PHR) systems have been proposed by various authors and companies [8] . PHR have many societal benets, such as to empower patients in the management of their own health and to foster interoperability among health care providers, possibly reducing the overall costs of diagnosis and treatment [9] . Policy makers, therefore, have repeatedly called for technologies that enable patients, doctors and other health care providers to access personal health records securely through the Internet, no matter where a patient is seeking medical care [10, 11] . Unfortunately, PHR adoption levels are very low due to privacy concerns as well as the lack of convincing medical and business use cases. The US department of Health and Human Services, for instance, has invested hundreds of millions dollars with the expectation that once the market has structure, patients, providers, medical professionals and vendors will innovate, create eciencies and improve care [10] .
One of the reasons for the low adoption of PHRs is their lack of openness at the platform level. Mandl et al. [12] have addressed the issue by looking at positive and negative experiences from various health record projects. The authors conclude that PHR technologies should go beyond the conventional requirements for Electronic Health Record (EHR) technologies, i.e., beyond interoperability, security, and privacy. PHR systems should support open innovation and, therefore, they should (a) reduce impediments to the transfer of data, (b) they should provide substitutable apps , and (c) they should allow competition and natural selection for high-value, low-cost software components. Regarding substitutability, the authors clarify that it should be possible to combine components from dierent vendors and there should be no impediments to replace software components over time [12] .
In this paper, we propose the use of MyPHRMachines, a PHR platform that satises the above requirements. The platform is unique in its openness: not only does it have the least possible impediments to the transfer of data, it is also unique in its guarantee that the platform design prevents apps from violating privacy requirements. These properties are based on the use of Virtual the eectiveness of the approach, we discuss externally contributed apps for Radiation Exposure Measure (REM). As we will show later, radiology and, more specically, REM, is a typical application scenario that can benet from an open PHR platform.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the shortcomings of current PHR platforms with regards to openness. Section 3 describes the MyPHRMachines platform. Section 4 presents and gives the motivation for the REM application scenario, while Section 5 describes the REM apps in MyPHRMachines. Finally, 6 discusses the contribution of the paper by providing a link also to the PHR literature.
Openness of PHR Platforms
Opening a platform enables its owning company to strategically open to outsiders aspects related to the development or commercialization of the platform [13] .
There are broadly two dierent approaches to opening a platform. The rst entails giving up some control over the platform, whereas the second entails only granting access to the platform to outsiders [14] . When a company devolves all control over a platform, there is no longer a single party who controls its evolution. In terms of PHR platforms, this would mean for example that the development activities for a platform are opened up to the open source community, or to selected commercial software vendors. The Indivo platform is the primary example of this form of PHR platform openness [15] : starting from a development project at the Harvard Medical School and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the project was opened up to the open source community as well as to Google, Microsoft and other commercial players. The second form of openness (granting access ) implies that the platform owner maintains control over its core development, yet calls for the market to provide complementary innovation around it. Apple's App store is a well known example of this approach, where the company not only preserves control over the platform's development, but even controls the transactions on the platform. Microsoft HealthVault is a well known PHR platform that is open to apps from third party developers while Microsoft controls the core platform [16] .
When aiming at developing an open PHR platform, the novelty of our work is in the latter category: we provide app developers with open access to the app platform but we control the platform to guarantee that patients can blindly trust the platform in the protection of their personal data. As illustrated below, other PHR platforms are either (1) completely closed or (2) pose too tight restrictions on the type of data that can be managed by the platform. In the latter case, technical guarantees regarding the prevention of data abuse are completely missing. Therefore, for those PHR platforms that grant app developers access to deploy their apps, access is only granted to trusted parties that can be held liable in case they are found to violate their promises to the platform provider and end users. MyPHRMachines makes such app-specic trust considerations irrelevant, since technical privacy protection measures are already implemented at the platform level. Consequently, a MyPHRMachinesbased App store can be opened up securely also to non-trusted app developers.
PHR system architectures can be classied into provider-tethered and freestanding ones [17] . For the provider-tethered variant, the PHR system is essentially a portal extension of the Hospital Information System (HIS). Typically, HISs only contain data from one health care provider or institution. Examples in this category are EPIC MyChart [18] and MyHealtheVet [19] , tethered from EPIC EHR and the HIS of the US Department of Veterans Aairs, respectively. Free standing PHRs are stand-alone PHR platforms, which can store data generated and provided by various health care institutions or by the patient. Examples in this category are HealthVault and Indivo version X [15] . In principle, this classication only claries which stakeholder controls the PHR platform (a single health organization versus an independent party). In practice, it turns out that so far all tethered PHR systems are completely closed while some free-standing PHR systems make their platform accessible to external app builders. Still, there are fundamental issues even for these free-standing solutions. Below, we discuss some of those issues for the cases of Microsoft HealthVault and Indivo X.
Microsoft HealthVault provides a set of libraries (e.g. for Java and .NET developers) to Create, Read, Update, and Delete (CRUD) all types of data in the HealthVault system. The libraries are based on a Web service API. Similarly, Indivo X enables external software to perform CRUD operations on its health data through XML-based standard data models. Indivo X is also integrated with SMART [20] , a more general solution to support the exchange of health data among health institutions. SMART provides an OWL-DL ontology to semantically annotate health data. Unfortunately, for both platforms, two of Section 1's requirements are not satised:
1. existing platforms do not actively prevent apps from violating end-user privacy requirements, and 2. existing platforms pose impediments on the transfer of health data.
The rst issue relates to Mandl et al.'s conventional" requirements for EHR systems, while the second one relates to their extra requirements for openness.
The privacy issue is caused by the fact that neither HealthVault nor Indivo X apps are executed inside a controlled ecosystem. Instead, app code is executed on third party infrastructure and if users grant an app access to load PHR data then that data can travel freely to the servers of the app providers. Then, in terms of liabilities, the platform providers (Microsoft and others) push responsibilities to the app builders and the end-users. This implies that (1) all app builders need to provide a terms of use agreement that promises that no patient data will be abused and (2) end-users need to review and consent such agreements for each and every app. While such agreements, of course, can protect end-users ex-post (e.g., legally) they do not physically prevent app providers to maliciously use the PHR data behind the scenes. Also, for app builders with no interests at all in patient data, this need for app-specic data use agreements forms an undesirable barrier to entering the app market.
The second issue (i.e., impediments on the transfer of health data) is caused by the fact that data can only be stored on the HealthVault or Indivo X based servers if it strictly conforms to the data formats that have been selected by the platform providers. This is a fundamental limitation since it prevents a marketbased evolution of such formats. As a practical example of the impediment, we observe that it is impossible to store radiology images at the level of the Indivo X platform and the European deployment of HealthVault. A practical negative consequence is that, for example for Microsoft HealthVault, many third party apps store data outside the platform's data repository. More specically, there are various third party HealthVault extensions that do store radiology images. Yet, this content is stored on third party servers. That is in conict with the substitutability of the PHR apps, since only the apps from that third party can then access the radiology data. Over time, platforms such as Indivo X and HealthVault may catch up with such example limitations but we argue that fundamentally, there will always be medically meaningful data for which the competitive app market moves ahead of platform-imposed standard data formats.
In the remainder, we explain how MyPHRMachines overcomes these issues.
MyPHRMachines as an Open and Trustable PHR App Platform
In this paper we focus on the aspects of MyPHRMachines that make it an open platform. Other details about MyPHRMachines can be found in previous work of the authors [21, 22, 23] .
MyPHRMachines is a cloud-based PHR system. It gives patients convenient access to remotely running virtual machines (VMs), which give access to all their PHR data. VMs are the MyPHRMachines-specic app technology. VMs run as a service on a trusted and powerful hardware infrastructure and fulll the role of app containers. We informally dene apps as light-weight applications that provide very focused functionality (as opposed to monolythic information systems). MyPHRMachines apps can be accessed from regular computers and from tablets or mobile phones. The server layer is further decomposed into an execution layer and a storage layer.
MyPHRMachines relies on thin clients: a client should be able to (1) In the Storage layer, Figure 1 shows also the Private Network Folders. While the private data cloud requires an ad-hoc, virtual network to the OwnCloud server that runs within the MyPHRMachines infrastructure, these mounted folders are accessible even to VMs that have no network interface at all. Although the OwnCloud server is residing in a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ [26] ), protected by a rewall, it is not as secure as the mounted folders mechanism since in theory an app could hack its way from the ad-hoc network to the OwnCloud server and then to the public internet. This is impossible for VMs without a network interface.
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The execution layer of the MyPHRMachines server contains two components: Patients can communicate with their health providers in two ways: rst, they can delegate the remote access to a VM and, secondly, they can share the raw PHR data using the underlying data cloud. This private data cloud provides le sharing features similar to DropBox and Google Drive but also ensures that the physical location of the data is by default within the trusted MyPHRMachines infrastructure. This feature was added to MyPHRMachines recently (i.e., after the publication of our previous work [21, 22, 23] ). It relates in general to removing impediments to the transfer of data between trusted parties (cf., the criteria from Section 1). Among others, it enables patients to grant their GP a copy of specic PHR les if they are needed for the sake of accountability. Also, thanks to the mature OwnCloud sync client, patients can conveniently upload new PHR content (e.g., a copy of a new radiology CD).
Open innovation is supported by MyPHRMachines by the fact that any health care institution or software provider can contribute a new app by remotely cloning an existing VM image, installing the new software remotely, and publishing it to the app store. App developers can choose between accessing health data les directly from the VM le system or accessing data through a more heavy-weight Application Programmer Interface (API). The platform is exible in that any kind of middleware that runs on an operating system that can be virtualized can also be used to build apps.
VM sessions in MyPHRMachines are stateless, meaning that in general data that is written to the local disk of a VM will be discarded upon VM shutdown.
This enables app developers to realize updates of their VMs without having to worry about migrating patient-specic VM sessions. MyPHRMachines does enable apps to create or update data persistently in a patient's PHR. This is realized by means of a writable mounted folder in the patient's VMs. Additionally, data can be persisted via the private data cloud.
Privacy Protection as a Platform Service
MyPHRMachines protects privacy as a platform service. As indicated in Section 2, no other platform provides technical mechanisms for this, while this is seen as essential in the context of the requirements discussed in Section 1.
This subsection claries that, in contrast to the novelty of having this service, its implementation is relatively simple to realize, given the architecture described in the previous subsection.
MyPHRMachines can provide a privacy protection service thanks to its very design, which is based on the principle that software should be moved to data Can the data pass over servers that are subject to the US patriot act? Etc.).
Note that MyPHRMachines does not guarantee privacy protection in general. In particular, since MyPHRMachines aims to reduce impediments to the transfer of data, patients can choose to use the OwnCloud component in combination with a US-based cloud storage provider (e.g., DropBox), and therefore be subject, for instance, to the NSA scrutiny. Yet, MyPHRMachines does guarantee that PHR data is protected from app builders (and their governments).
This implies that when a MyPHRMachines cloud is deployed on EU infrastructure, the NSA could not force US-based app builders to give access to PHR data on which their apps are applied. This example implication is of high political relevance in current times. 1 .
Example App: Radiology Image Viewer
Radiology tests are often repeated due to the loss of a test result or due to inconvenient provider access to the images. Besides being inconvenient and unhealthy for patients, this also represents a waste of insurance and taxpayers money. In order to avoid this waste, insurance companies can simply provide their patients free use of a specialized Microsoft Windows app (virtual machine)
in MyPHRMachines [21] . As illustrated below, that is sucient for giving any specialist convenient online access to a patient's radiology images.
Ge et al. have recently published about a novel portal prototype to store and share radiology images under patient ownership [27] . The MyPHRMachines radiology image viewer app presented here provides the same functionality as that prototype but (1) the implementation of the MyPHRMachines app is simpler and (2) the app is substitutable. The implementation of the app is simpler since it reuses viewer software that is already embedded in the patient's radiology CD. Moreover, the functionality to give a physician access to the viewer is implemented at the MyPHRMachines platform layer. The app is substitutable since anyone can install a more advanced viewer to a new VM and oer that to other MyPHRMachines users. The delegation of access to radiology images does not require any app-specic implementation since it is supported by a generic MyPHRMachines platform feature, i.e. the app store portal (see Figure 1) . That portal enables patients to delegate access to any of their active VMs. More specically, for every active VM, patients can generate an automatic e-mail message which enables the recepient to log in to the remote VM without signing up for a MyPHRMachines account [21] .
Contributing a new App to MyPHRMachines
The aforementioned companion Web site of this paper will be maintained to provide up-to-date instructions for contributing new apps. In this paper, we abstract from the rather volatile user interface details and focus on the conceptual workow for deploying new apps to MyPHRMachines. Technical details have been published before [22, 23] , so we omit them here. The workow can only proceed from one task A to a successor task B if (1) A is completed and (2) for each incoming message ow in B, a message has been received. Following this semantics, Figure 3 sketches that the app builder can only deploy his binaries to the cloned VM after the clone request was approved by an administrator, and after that administrator has moved the cloned VM to a private group. The purpose of such group is to contain virtual machines that
are not yet appropriate for display in the app store. yet their VM instances will be initialized with their own test data. Each tester can upload test data using the same functionality that end-users use to upload PHR data. If either the alpha tester or app builder think the VM is not ready yet for a release to the app store, the workow moves back to task Deploy Binaries". Upon each entry of that task, the app builder gets private and mutable access to the VM conguration. When completing the task, the VM conguration is saved such that each tester and subsequent user will start from the same software conguration context.
When the app builder decides to publish a VM, a group administrator moves it to a public group. Finally, the VM is made available in the app store. Optionally, a quality check can rst be performed by platform maintenance sta. The workow from Figure 3 focuses on the general case. MyPHRMachines manages the access rights and stakeholder notications for the various tasks. Also, the system supports variations to the basic workow.
Radiation Exposure Monitoring
This section introduces our application scenario of Radiation Exposure Monitoring (REM). We rst discuss the need for REM in Section 4.1 and then pro- 
The Need for Patient-Level REM Services
X-rays have been ocially classied as a carcinogen by research agencies and prevention centers [29, 30] . The presumption is that signicant increase in the population's cumulative exposure to ionizing radiation will cause an increased incidence of cancer years down the line. We cannot take a passive data collection and prevention approach, since Radiation-induced cancers typically do not occur until 1 or 2 decades or longer after exposure. [31] The largest epidemiologic study so far shows a statistically signicant increase in cancer at radiation dose estimates in excess of 50 mSv [32] . Many computed tomographic (CT) scans and nuclear medicine studies have eective dose estimates whose cumulative doses easily exceed this level [31] . Related knowledge is gradually expanding, among others via international cohort studies [33] . In the meanwhile, the current annual collective dose estimate from medical exposure in the United States has been calculated as roughly equivalent to the total worldwide collective dose generated by the nuclear catastrophe at Chernobyl [31, 34, 35] . REM aims at monitoring the level of exposure to ionizing radiation by patients. Over the last decades, signicant progress has been achieved by monitoring mean exposure values against so-called Diagnostic Reference Levels (DRLs).
Rehani for example shows that initially some countries had very disturbing high exposures whereas results were more harmonized after alerting these issues and acting upon them [36] . This is all however at the national policy level and the that receive dangerously high exposures will remain un-noticed by today's radiology information systems. To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not received formal research attention yet, but one can easily conceive high cancer risk scenarios.
From a hospital informatics point of view it is indeed challenging that patients are likely to undergo scans at dierent health care institutions during their life. In contrast, organizing REM support around the patient is very natural:
patients can track exactly the number and type of scans they have undergone.
We argue that patients should therefore be empowered with PHR based REM application software. That would enable them to monitor their radiation exposure over time and discuss it with their caregivers. This patient empowerment enables doctors to make better risk assessments and specialize the diagnosis and treatment plan.
Large radiology technology vendors are aware of the aforementioned issues.
However, Brosky has recently claried on a professional radiologist community website why it is unrealistic that they will provide integrated REM services soon [37] . The author describes the results of a European vendor-oriented integration workshop. Although various vendors are oering standard-compliant dose reporting products, these products are deemed to fail on today's market.
On the one hand, there is a vast installation base of legacy products that (1) do not support the standard reporting interfaces and (2) that are not expected be phased out. Moreover, even when a standard-compliant reporting system is used, healthcare administrators still need to congure (or program) the data transfers between local and centralized REM systems. At the recent European integration workshop, only one of eight participating companies provided a full-scale dose information reporter that enables a healthcare system to look into the accumulated data and extract actionable information. [37] . Other vendors indicated that If we build it now, no one will buy it .
Calculating the Cumulative Estimated Dose of Radiology Absorption
There is a key dierence between the radiation exposure from the various imaging modalities and the actual amount of radiation absorbed by a patient.
The latter is dependent on the amount and properties of each tissue encountered by the X-ray beam. As it is not practical to insert radiation detectors into each organ of every patient, absorbed radiation dose is measured only directly in extreme cases of oncology treatment. Therefore, there is a great need to support the accurate estimation of absorbed radiation doses.
Promising results have been achieved in the area of automatic CED calculation. More specically, recent software programs enable the automatic extraction and analysis of dose-related parameters from image meta-data. So far, these programs have only been used within complex pipelines. For example, Jahnen et al. [38] use such an extraction component within the PerMoS chain, which is primarily designed to monitor DRL conformance at the governmental level. Aware, inc, provides a chain that also relies on a central dose index registry. The Aware chain does include components at ner granularity levels: it provides support for monitoring the conformance of individual technician and physicians and also aims at risk management for individual patients [39] .
However, for monitoring patient-level exposures, the Aware chain assumes that all hospitals visited by the patient push their data to the central registry. As claried by Brosky [37] , this is unfortunately not realistic.
At the core of the aforementioned chains are however extraction and analysis components that would provide patient-level CED calculations if they are provided with patient-level data. In this paper, we use MyPHRMachines to provide patient-level data securely to the extraction and analysis components of PerMoS and Aware.
REM Apps in MyPHRMachines
We have deployed the two alternative CED management components of the Tudor and Aware chains apps in MyPHRMachines. Both apps visualize received dose values in a patient-centered representation. In the following, we rst discuss the input format requirement of both apps. We then discuss the key functionalities of the individual apps. Finally, we reason about the implications of having these two demonstrators.
App Input: DICOM
The DICOM standard denes a le format for storing radiology data on physical media (e.g., CD ROMs) as well as a communication protocol for transferring images from/to remote servers.
File Format DICOM prescribes a standard format for storing radiology images. Additionally, the standard prescribes how to store information about the image data. Such information is called metadata". Besides standardizing metadata for characterizing the patient (e.g., name), the standard also prescribes metadata elds for storing technical equipment and machine parameters (e.g., scanner model, scan length, scan modality and scan location). When using full digital equipment, dose information is stored explicitly in DICOM elds too. For older equipment types however, such information is missing and therefore the aforementioned simulation methods need to be employed. The rst app (MyPHRDoseReporter) supports full digital equipment as well as legacy equipment while the second app only supports full digital equipment.
Communication Protocol The second app includes a VM startup script that automatically collects all the user's radiology data and sends that via standard DICOM protocol messages to the Aware REM server that is running locally in the remote VM.
From an end-user's perspective, the second aspect is an implementation detail.
What does matter for end-users is that both apps require input data stored in the DICOM le format. All metrics from Table 1 are well known to radiology specialists. Moreover,
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Aware App: MyAccuradREMServer 15 specialists tend to use their own reference values for these metrics, depending on hospital protocols as well as national guidelines. Therefore, MyPHRDoseReporter simply presents the raw metric results and leaves the interpretation of the data to the app user. In the long term, the following issues need to be tackled:
1. understanding which dosimetry concepts are of relevance to patients, 2. understanding which dosimetry concepts are useful for radiology nurses, 3. understanding how the degree of uncertainty can be properly presented.
These issues are the subject of ongoing research at Tudor. In future versions of the app, we may (1) include appropriate reference values in the output report 
Results
From a results perspective, we stress that (1) both apps have been developed and deployed by stakeholders outside the MyPHRMachines project and (2) none of the two apps requires any extension to the MyPHRMachines platform. This illustrates that the platform is indeed open to external functionality. We also stress that the apps consume data in a format that the platform is unaware of (i.e., DICOM content). This is in contrast to the requirements that other app- example apps discussed in this paper, patients can indeed present cumulative dose reports to their radiologist that in general cannot be generated by the enterprise system that is used by this specialist: even hospitals that have a state-of-the-art REM server typically still lack integration with other hospitals (cf., Section 4.2). Therefore, exposures from tests in other hospitals would not be taken into account. Therefore, the REM analysis would not be as complete as one that is based on PHR data.
Discussion
This section discusses how this paper relates to the PHR literature. In particular, Section 6.1 discusses the advantages and potential pitfalls of using VMs as a more general PHR platform technology. Section 6.2 focuses on literature on PHR adoption barriers and facilitators. We include that section to clarify how we have leveraged adoption studies from other PHR systems in the design of MyPHRMachines.
Strengths and Potential Pitfalls of Using Virtual Machines as Apps
This section discusses the key strengths of the VM-based architecture as well as pitfalls that should be avoided by app developers. The key strengths of the architecture are its exibility and trustability. The exibility strength is illustrated best by the DICOM viewer example: no programming was needed to deploy an o-the-shelf DICOM viewer into MyPHRMachines. This exibility is in strong contrast to PHR architectures with restrictive APIs (such as Indivo X [15] ), which would require a signicantly higher eort to build and maintain the apps described in this paper. The trustability strength follows from the aforementioned platform feature that makes it impossible for apps to send patient data to external servers.
The exibility strength, however, comes with a pitfall: since the MyPHRMachines platform does not impose the use of standard data formats, a naive use of the platform would result in patient records full of syntactically or semantically incompatible fragments. When app developers are aware of this pitfall, we argue they could turn it into an enabler: app developers can deploy apps to translate health record fragments into a proprietary format (or in the format of a deprecated standard) or into the latest standard format. We argue that again the ability to obtain such functionality from the App market makes the architecture more scalable than architectures where only the platform owners can provide data conversion functionality. Also, the fact that MyPHRMachines does not impose any data standards does not prevent anyone from using standards: in this paper, for example, we leverage DICOM as a standard for storing radiology data.
Another pitfall along a similar direction is that MyPHRMachines app developers would re-build low-level functionality rather than reuse middleware features provided by platforms with heavyweight APIs. Instead of making this mistake, app developers should install inside their VM any meaningful middleware they can aord. For example, developers of diabetes-specic apps may want to deploy SMART middleware to their virtual machine [20] . This would provide them (among others) with libraries to deal with lab data coded using the Logical Observation Identiers Names and Codes (LOINC) standard.
The MyPHRMachines trustability strength also comes at a cost: by blocking 
MyPHRMachines and PHR adoption barriers
In relation to the issues described in Section 2, McGraw acknowledges that today's PHR systems too often impose consent contracts that jeopardize patient privacy [41] . The author calls for more reliable privacy measures. Kahn et al.
also alert that providers of PHR software services are not necessarily subject to US privacy laws and therefore are not as trustworthy as conventional care
providers [42] . Another study by Witry et al. also reveals concerns about the consent contracts imposed by today's systems [43] .
MyPHRMachines provides privacy at the platform level, making app -specic is that if within a specic context, one trusted party oers the MyPHRMachines platform then all the untrusted parties (e.g., the aforementioned insurers and employers) can eectively deploy apps to that ecosystem. Especially if patients do not trust their data to the app providers, the MyPHRMachines platform guarantees that apps can not send data to the untrusted party.
Kahn et al. conclude that the key technical adoption barrier for PHRs has been that patients had to provide a lot of information manually, using tedious (and error-prone) web forms [42] . Moreover, many studies report that doctors are concerned about patients being too poorly informed to understand the meaning of their PHR data [45, 46] . Family physicians interviewed by Witry et al. therefore viewed potential in PHRs as a backup source of medical information secondary to the patient's medical record as opposed to a tool for patient self-care [43] . Also, a physician from that study expressed that For quality and eciency it is worth it and It is worth it to give it to people for free. You'd save the (US) government money. . We argue that the data entry problems reported by Kahn et al. primarily apply to PHR applications for manually entering dietary information etc. In the context of this paper, we envision that in the long term, data is pushed automatically to the PHR once it is produced in a hospital (or once a copy arrives at a patient's GP) or by devices. In our radiology use case, we expect at this point that patients upload the content of a radiology CD. Patients have a good incentive to upload the data, as they then do not have to worry anymore about preserving the physical CD. The MyPHRMachines platform also provides technical interfaces (beyond the scope of Section 3.1) that enable hospitals to send the radiology data directly, which saves them the time and costs of creating CDs and sending them to patient homes.
Another study concludes that family physicians are quite open to sharing information with patients, as long as the related information systems are easy to use and as long as their value to the practice of medicine has been demonstrated [46] . Regarding usability, we have also taken into account study results by Witry et al. [43] : the authors conclude that physicians are generally concerned about the time it takes to log into a PHR system and lookup specic information. We have taken this concern into account by enabling patients to
(1) collect specic information as preparation for a time-critical doctor meeting and (2) provide one-click physician access to that specic information, as explained in Section 3.3. Regarding medical relevance, we stress that the REM apps provide unprecedented support for personalizing patient safety in radiology (cf., Section 4.1, which stresses the importance of REM in the context of cancer prevention).
Conclusions
We have demonstrated the potential of a recently proposed PHR platform in terms of its openness. The so-called MyPHRMachines platform satises criteria that had been identied previously by Mandl et al. yet for which the existing platforms suered from weaknesses related to the types of data supported as well as to the way in which they handle data privacy. MyPHRMachines leverages Virtual Machines as exible and secure execution sandboxes. We have demonstrated the exibility by showing that without any changes to the base platform, external developers could deploy apps that deal with data that cannot be handled by the repositories of other PHR platforms. The privacy strength follows from the platform design: the virtual machine sandboxes reside in a private cloud and app is not allowed to push data outside its sandbox. In our future work, we will evaluate MyPHRMachines in a controlled clinical setting. Moreover, our example apps will be rened and new demonstrators will be designed, among others using data from various types of devices.
